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REBEL BEEF: FLORIDA CATTLE AND THE
CONFEDERATE ARMY, 1862-1864
b y R O B E R T A. T A Y L O R

F

supplied the Confederacy with thousands of head
of cattle during the Civil War. Beef provided an important
food source for soldiers in the lower South. Beef kept the Army
of Tennessee from starving during the winters of 1863 and
1864, and meat sustained the defenders of Charleston while
under Union seige. The Confederate Commissary Bureau had
little difficulty supplying their armies with beef during the first
year of the war, but by the beginning of 1862, it became increasingly hard to procure. To increase the number of available cattle, the Bureau awarded contracts to civilian agents to locate and
bring in beef. A contractor system seemed natural for the wilderness that was Florida, where large cattle herds were known
to exist. The state was expected to supply 25,000 head to the
military by the beginning of 1863.1
Confederate reverses in Tennessee in 1862 placed great
strain on the army’s ration system. General Braxton Bragg’s
abortive invasion of Kentucky can be seen in part as an effort
to supply his troops from the richness of the area’s agriculture.
While in Tennessee his men had been able to subsist on that
state’s meat supply with ease, especially since little transportation
was needed. The Bureau reported that two-thirds of the cattle
being slaughtered for the army came from Tennessee, the remainder from Virginia and other places like Florida. If the armies could hold these areas there would be adequate meat in
late 1862 and early 1863; if not, a serious crisis would occur.
LORIDA
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The loosely-knit organization of the military showed signs of
inefficiency as army commissaries frequently competed with
those contracted by the Bureau in Richmond. Such competition
existed in middle Tennessee during the winter of 1862-1863,
and made the gathering of needed supplies difficult.2
The year 1863 began with the thunder of massed guns as
Union and Confederate armies battered and bloodied each
other at the Battle of Murfreesboro. After an inconclusive threeday struggle, the Army of Tennessee began a retreat southward
in the general direction of Chattanooga. The soldiers nearly
starved along the 200-mile march, for the path of their retreat
had been thoroughly scoured by Commissary Bureau agents
who had removed, among other things, thousands of head of
cattle. The main supply depot in Atlanta presented a gloomy
picture of its available stocks, the bulk of which had been shipped to Lee’s army in Virginia. Major John F. Cummings, commander of the depot, had 4,000 head of cattle on hand, but
knew that they could not feed 40,000 hungry men for very long.
All the provisions were already earmarked for the Army of
Northern Virginia. Critical scarcity was fast approaching unless
energetic steps were undertaken.3
Secretary of War James Seddon assured Joseph E. Johnston,
the new theater commander in the west, that the Confederacy
was being ransacked for army supplies. Any deficit in rations
would be made up from other sources. Major Cummings, one
of the best and most efficient commissaries in the Bureau, would
be able to collect and ship the necessary food. Johnston had faith
in Cummings’s abilities, but faith alone could not feed hungry
men. Bragg estimated that his men would need 400,000 pounds
of meat to fulfill ration requirements just for the month of
March 1863. Cummings forwarded only about 191,000 pounds,
less than one-half Bragg’s needs, and had little prospect of sending more. As supply officers pondered their options, it was
known that Florida had large herds of cattle, some of which it
had already been providing the military. More Florida beef was
needed to help ease the shortage. If meat was not obtained, it
2.
3.

Goff, Confederate Supply, 37; Gilbert E. Govan and James W. Livingwood,
A Different Valor: The Story of General Joseph E. Johnston, C.S.A. (Indianapolis
and New York, 1956), 187.
O.R. Series 1, vol. 23, part 2, 680, 689; Thomas L. Connelly, Autumn of
Glory: The Army of Tennessee, 1862-1865 (Baton Rouge, 1977), 17.
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would be impossible to feed the Army of Tennessee. The disintegration of a major Confederate field army hung in the balance.4
Governor John Milton issued a special message to Florida
farmers, ranchers, and planters early in 1863. Production of all
foodstuffs must be increased, he urged, for the war would not
be ending in the forseeable future, and the army must have a
steady supply in order to prevail. As supply officers looked towards Florida’s resources, there was a marked change in the
relationship of the state’s cattle trade with the Confederate military. Cattle smuggling would greatly expand in scope, and the
open-market-contract system would deteriorate. Florida could
no longer remain a secondary source if the needs of the military
were to be met. A comprehensive system of commissary agents
to maximize collection and shipment of cattle would be created,
replacing the contractor operation. The state would now have a
chief commissary officer who would control collection and distribution, and who would deal with both the Commissary
Bureau and the supply officers in those armies operating in or
near Florida. Commissary-General Lucius B. Northrop believed
that when the system was in place there would be no part of the
Confederacy that would not be providing the army with
supplies. Such a network of energetic officers would mean that
wherever Confederate troops moved all the supplies of the
country would be tributary to their use.5
As April 1863 passed, the food situation in the Army of
Tennessee showed some signs of improvement. Three thousand
head of cattle, mostly from Florida, were on hand in Georgia.
The cattle driving season had begun in Florida, and cows from
the southern portion of the state began arriving at army supply
depots. But events in the west would soon affect Florida’s posi4.
5.

O.R. Series 1, vol. 23, part 2, 658, 702; Joseph E. Johnston, Narrative of
Military Operations, Directed during the Late War Between the States (New York,
1874; reprint ed., Bloomington, 1959), 351.
George W. Randolph to John Milton, April 3, 1862, General Correspondence, John Milton Papers, Florida Historical Society Collection, University
of South Florida, Tampa (hereinafter cited as Milton Papers); W. Buck
Yearns, “Florida,” The Confederate Governors, W. Buck Yearns, ed. (Athens,
GA. 1985), 65-66; John E. Johns, Florida During the Civil War (Gainesville,
1963), 143; William W. Davis, The Civil War and Reconstruction in Florida
(New York, 1913; facsimile ed., Gainesville, 1964), 268-70; Thomas R.
Hay, “Lucius B. Northrop: Commissary-General of the Confederacy,” Civil
War History 9 (March 1963), 7.

Published by STARS, 1988

3

Florida Historical Quarterly, Vol. 67 [1988], No. 1, Art. 4
18

FLORIDA HISTORICAL QUARTERLY

tion in the Confederate supply equation. Union forces moved
steadily down the Mississippi, slowing to a trickle the flow of
supplies from the Trans-Mississippi region. As the number of
cattle swimming the river into the southern heartland decreased
to almost none, Richmond urged that efforts to bring them over
somehow be stepped up. The lack of Texas beef did not have a
very great influence on the price of Florida beef purchased for
the army. Beef delivered in Georgia sold for between eighteen
and twenty-five cents per pound, and that price remained
steady. In the case of beef, government attempts at price controls seemed to be having some influence.6
The new chief commissary agent of Florida, Pleasant W.
White, had no sooner settled into his assignment when a blow
was struck from which the South would not recover. On July 4,
1863, the garrison at Vicksburg surrendered to Union General
Ulysses Grant, and the Mississippi once again flowed unimpeded to the sea. Union patrols ranged up and down the river
and effectively stopped any attempt to move substantial numbers of cattle or other supplies across. The Confederate high
command now had to depend even more on Florida beef to
feed its soldiers. The loss of the Mississippi, coupled with the
Union occupation of Tennessee, served to make the South’s
position even more precarious. It made it increasingly difficult
for the Commissary Bureau to provide the needed rations.7
Joseph D. Locke, chief commissary of Georgia, estimated
that Florida would have to ship 1,000 head of cattle per week
to meet the needs of General Bragg and the forces at Charleston
under General P. G. T. Beauregard. “This requisition,” wrote
Locke, “is indispensably necessary for the public interest.“8 This
urgency was underlined by a reduction in the meat ration of
each soldier in July to one-quarter pound per day. The commissary-general publicly minimized the dangerous shortage, say6.

O.R., Series 1, vol. 23, part 2, 759-60; Willard E. Wright, ed., “Some Letters
of Lucius Bellinger Northrop, 1860-1865,” Virginia Magazine of History and
Biography 68 (October 1960), 466, 471-74; General Orders of the Adjutant and
Inspector General’s Office, Confederate States Army (Columbia, 1864), 76
(hereinafter cited as General Orders).
7. Paul Gates, Agriculture and the Civil War (New York, 1965), 73-74.
8. Joseph D. Locke to Pleasant W. White, n.d., Pleasant W. White Papers,
Box 1, Florida Historical Society Collection (hereinafter cited as White
Papers).
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ing that European peasants rarely saw meat and that the people
of Hindustan never had any. But privately he reported that
there were only thirty days worth of rations left for the entire
Confederate army.9
By August 1863 cattle were being moved out of Florida in
large numbers, but not the 3,000 head per week that the army
had called for. Collecting and driving semi-wild bovines was an
assignment that only experienced wranglers could handle effectively. Requests for detailing men who had experience working
with cattle for duty in Florida had been granted in only a few
cases. In spite of these obstacles, cattle were getting through.
Between 1,500 and 2,000 reached Bragg’s army from the depot
at Madison, Florida, during the five-week period. August was
traditionally the last month of the cattle driving season as trail
conditions— heat, humidity, and a lack of water supplies— in
Florida made it impractical to drive beef any considerable distance. But in 1863 this was not to be the case.10
On August 25 an urgent appeal from General Bragg arrived
at White’s headquarters in Quincy. The loss of supplies from
Tennessee had deeply cut available stocks, and Georgia was unable to make up the differences. Troops in his army were suffering from a food shortage such as they had never known before.
Could Florida help? White wasted no time in his response. He
ordered an additional 6,000 to 8,000 head collected and forwarded to Georgia. White promised Bragg in a letter that he
would try to ship 1,000 head per week, but the advanced season
would make it very difficult to maintain that rate.11
In Atlanta, Major Cummings did not believe that all was
being done to secure and deliver Florida beef. His agents in the
state told him that there was an abundance of cattle, “but the
people are indisposed to sell them for our currency and drivers
cannot be found.” Many head of cattle could be had in Florida,
but it would take a proper organization and an energetic approach to make them available. Cummings received authorization to secure cattle from the region himself, but he realized
that he would need more men and the assistance of state offi9. John B. Jones, A Rebel War Clerk’s Diary at the Confederate States Capital, Earl
Schenk Miers, ed. (New York, 1961), 246.
10. White to John F. Cummings, August 25, 1863, White Papers, Box 2, Letterbook 1.
11. White to A. G. Summer, August 25, 1863, ibid.
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cials. White defended his methods of obtaining beef by making
it clear that the heavy demand that had been placed upon him
could only be met with cattle from the ranges south of Tampa
Bay. The bulk of the state’s cattle grazed there, and that was
where White would be forced to go in the future. Only Floridians, it seemed, understood how to collect cattle on these southern ranges. They knew the ever-present dangers of the trail:
snakes, sudden storms that caused stampedes, lack of water and
grass, and sawgrass marshes that could cut both men and cow
to pieces if they tried to pass through.13
The nagging food shortage contained to plague the Confederate troops near Chattanooga into the fall. Major White, forced
by the gravity of the situation, accepted the dispatching of Cumming’s men into Florida to find cattle. Captain Charles F. Stubbs
was authorized by White to act as Cummings’s agent and to
receive beef for the Army of Tennessee or for General
Beauregard’s command, or both, as the case might be. The supply officers realized that it would not be possible to secure the
cattle needed in depleted north or central Florida. Beauregard
alone required 100 head per day for his men, a figure that
exceeded all efforts in collections and herding. A lack of drivers
also hampered operations. Cattle had to be driven all the way
to the point of delivery, and in many cases there was no available
manpower. In theory the beef could be transferred to cattle cars
in Georgia capable of carrying them speedily to Savannah. Here
they would either be diverted to Dalton, Georgia, via Macon
and Atlanta, or continue directly to Charleston. Overland drovers usually followed the rails to the beseiged city, while those
herds earmarked for the Army of Tennessee plodded toward
the main depot in Atlanta by the easiest roads or trails.14
While records are sketchy, it is evident that significant numbers of Florida cattle did make the trek northward. In the second half of September 1863, over 2,100 head were gathered in
the Fourth Commissary District, an area covering most of north
12.
13.

14.

O.R., Series 1, vol. 30, part 4, 552.
White to Lucius B. Northrop, August 29, 1863; White to Locke, September
2, 1863; White to Summer, September 2, 1863, White Papers, Box 2, Letterbook 1; Joe G. Warner, Biscuits and Taters: A History of Cattle Ranching
in Manatee County (Bradenton, 1980), 76-79.
Summer to White, September 2, 1863, White Papers, Box 1; George H.
Dacy, Four Centuries of Florida Ranching (St. Louis, 1940), 52.
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and central Florida; 1,420 were sent to Charleston and 706 were
held to fill future requests. Curiously, the bulk of this district’s
beef went to Beauregard, even though the Army of Tennessee
had been given priority on all Florida beef shipments. Florida
cattle were getting to the front lines, but there was just not
enough to meet even minimal needs.15
A new appeal for beef was made by the chief commissary of
the Army of Tennessee on October 2. There was apprehension
in Atlanta that White would fail to meet the army’s urgent
needs. Aware of this lack of confidence, White urged his district
commanders to do everything in their power to increase purchases even if they had to neglect their other duties. Shipping
cattle was “first and paramount for the next two months.”
Florida beef was all that was now available for South Carolina.
Messages practically begging White to put every agency into
motion to forward cattle through Georgia to Charleston began
arriving at his headquarters. Major Henry C. Guerin, chief commissary of South Carolina, joined in placing all hopes of feeding
his men on beef from Florida. “Our situation,” he wrote, “is full
of danger . . . from want of meat, and extraordinary efforts are
required to prevent disaster.“16
Tension between the various commands increased after yet
another urgent appeal from the chief commissary of the Army
of Tennessee for cattle. White responded that he could not have
anticipated the concentration of troops in the greater Atlanta
area, which made the large requisition necessary. He felt that if
the army had taken him into its confidence, perhaps some of
the shortages could have been avoided. White explained that he
had gone to south Florida himself, where he had “ridden
through mud and water by day and night among alligators and
insects” to spur collections and driving. In this same combative
spirit, he sent an inquiry to the commissary-general in
Richmond asking why all the district commanders in Georgia
had been promoted to the rank of major while his men in
Florida had not been so advanced. “I suppose the reasons for
15.
16.

“Report on Commissary Stores,” Fourth District, September, 1863, White
Papers, Miscellaneous Correspondence.
Samuel Proctor, ed., Florida A Hundred Years Ago (Tallahassee, 1960-1965),
October, 1963, 1; Johns, Florida During the Civil War, 191; White to John
P. Baldwin, October 2, 1863, White Papers, Box 2, Letterbook 1.
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this promotion,” he wrote, “could be equally applicable to those
in this state.“17
Braxton Bragg, his army in the grips of a crippling food
shortage, had little time for musing about advances in rank. He
bitterly complained to Richmond that there were only a few
weeks of scant rations left in the Atlanta depot. There had been
no meat to issue for days, and he wanted immediate action from
the commissary-general. Northrop caustically blamed Bragg for
the crisis; by evacuating Tennessee he had abandoned its stocks
of cattle and other supplies. If Bragg needed food for his army,
he should take steps to recover Tennessee as soon as possible.
Rumors flew through the ranks of the Army of Tennessee that
millions of pounds of beef and pork were being stripped from
Georgia and Florida for General Lee’s use in Virginia while they
were going hungry. Northrop assured the secretary of war that
every effort was being made to feed all the gallant sons of the
Confederacy. Bragg’s army, dependent on Georgia and especially Florida, was suffering because the rail system in that area
was not adequate to handle the volume of traffic needed to haul
supplies to feed the troops.18
These arguments did little to ease the meat shortage in Georgia and South Carolina. Major Guerin had 40,000 soldiers and
laborers to feed, and the cattle available in South Carolina were
not one-tenth of what was needed. A commissary offiver on
leave from the Army of Tennessee told White of the suffering
that he saw on a daily basis in the camps. The stock of beef and
bacon was said to be exhausted; the army must now depend
entirely on what could be gathered on a weekly basis. One officer recorded that “starvation stares us in the face; the handwriting is on the wall.” General Beauregard’s demands became
even more desperate toward the end of October. To meet his
needs, White reserved one-third of the cattle he had on hand
for delivery to Charleston; 400 were deemed the minimum on
which the forces defending the city could survive.19
17.
18.

19.

White to Northrop, October 5, 1863; White to Locke, October 5, 1863, ibid.
O.R., Series 1, vol. 30, part 4, 714-15; Jones, A Rebel War Clerk, 288; Connelly, Autumn of Glory, 114; Stanley F. Horn, The Army of Tennessee: A Military History (Indianapolis and New York, c. 1941; reprint ed., Norman,
1953), 282.
Henry C. Guerin to White, October 9, 10, 1863; Cummings to White,
October 6, 19, 20, 1863, White Papers, Box 1.
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When the beef was slow in arriving, a staff officer was dispatched to Florida to check the delay and get the cattle shipments moving quickly. When he arrived at the commissary
headquarters at Quincy, he found that White was on an inspection tour of east Florida. A day later he met Major White, whom
he believed to be a competent and hardworking soldier. Delays
in shipping had not been caused by the presence of supply officers from Bragg’s army as had been believed. The officer concluded that White’s organization was new and not operating at
full capacity; it was a wonder that he had been able to accomplish so much under the circumstances. The major returned
to Charleston with the assurance that the promised one-third of
all available beef would be forwarded to Beauregard.20
All efforts aside, the lack of beef, especially Florida beef,
may have had a direct effect on the military situation. The Army
of Tennessee reeled from a series of battles fought around Chattanooga in November that culminated at the Battle of Missionary Ridge on November 25, 1863. The “miracle” of Missionary
Ridge turned out to be anything but for the Confederates. After
the center of their lines collapsed, Bragg’s troops broke and fled
in panic. They rallied near Dalton, Georgia, but only after the
army had lost more than 6,000 men in the fighting. One wonders how much of this Confederate defeat was caused by the
months of poor rations and little hope for better food. Perhaps
the seeds of the defeat were not to be found in the Clan of the
Union troops, but in the lack of Florida beef in the mess tins of
the Confederates. The cliche about battles being lost for the
want of a nail may be valid in this case.
A survey of available supplies did not bring much Christmas
cheer to Florida supply officers. The projected amount of all
types of meat which could be procured by the tax in kind, impressments, and purchases would meet minimal army needs
only until May 1864. This was not only true for Florida, but the
entire Confederacy. Speculators stood ready to reduce stocks
even further. White reported speculator applications as being
equivalent to the state’s entire agricultural surplus. The parties
making these requests also far out-bid the fixed schedule of
prices so that commissary officers were forced to impress or get
20.

White to Charles F. Stubbs, October 23, 1863; White to Baldwin, October
31, 1863, ibid., Box 2, Letterbook 1; O.R., Series 1, vol. 30, part 4, 717.
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nothing at all. White asked the secretary of war for authority to
remove such competition and let the government become the
sole purchaser. Secretary Seddon agreed that the existing laws
relating to speculation were flawed, but while they existed they
must be obeyed.21
In late December 1863 the district commissaries reported
that the cattle in their areas would not be able to survive the
drive to the army depots; there was a lack of proper grazing
along the trails. White ordered that no cattle be forwarded until
they were in sufficient condition to stand a drive to the depot
at Albany, Georgia, or to the railroad for shipment to Charleston. He had hoped to suspend all cattle operations till spring,
but events changed his plans. Orders had come down from the
Army of Tennessee for 20,000 head to be delivered as soon as
possible. Such a figure was clearly impossible to meet, but White
decided that Florida must send something to ward off added
hunger in the army camps. “The cattle will arrive in bad condition,” reported White, “yet I do not see how I can get along
without them . . . we must continue the supply no matter how
poor or how bad is their condition.“22
December saw a change in the command of Florida’s largest
beef customer. General Joseph E. Johnston replaced Bragg as
commander of the Army of Tennessee on December 16.
Johnston faced the task of leading an army that had undergone
both defeat and months of near-famine. Secretary Seddon
warned the new commander that he would have serious difficulties in providing the supplies required for the subsistence of his
command. Seddon assured Johnston that the Commissary
Bureau would be directed to aid in meeting his supply needs to
the best of its ability. The general wrote a stinging reply in
which he declared that under the present system he had to depend on “three majors in each state, none of whom owed him
obedience.” Johnston himself had no taste for logistical work,
but believed that he should have the responsibility instead of a

21.
22.

White to Joseph Finegan, December 11, 1863; White to James Seddon,
December 15, 1863, White Papers, Box 2, Letterbook 1.
White to B. French, December 23, 1863; White to Alonzo B. Noyes, December 27, 1863; White to Isaac Widgeon, December 18, 1863; White to
Summer, December 25, 1863, ibid.; James McKay to White, December 16,
1863, ibid., Box 1.
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number of officers “who had not been thought by the government competent to the duties of high military grades.“23
Johnston’s remarks were not only unkind, but they showed
an unusual lack of tact. These officers that he thought incompetent held the fate of his army in their hands. Florida beef was
at that moment moving toward his supply bases at Albany and
Quitman, Georgia, long after the cattle driving season should
have ended. The government’s order to continue driving until
Christmas showed a lack of understanding of the conditions in
Florida. Major White, on his own initiative, ordered those cows
unable to continue the northern trip to be kept in pastures in
Taylor and Lafayette counties where they would be held till the
spring when they would be ready for General Johnston’s men.
This was not the act of an incompetent officer, and Johnston’s
outburst may only reflect the frustration of a proud man losing
a war.24
A year-end look at one of the Florida districts shows the
extent of the shipment of beef to the Confederate armies.
Charleston had received 5,679 head from the Fourth District in
1863, Savannah stockyards held 899, and the Army of Tennessee
had received 3,564 head of beef cattle. The Fourth District, when
the requisitions for units operating in Florida are included, had
sent a total of 10,142 head of cattle. White estimated that around
30,000 head had been moved out during 1863; how many had
been taken illegally was not known. The following year would
not be as productive for only 20,000 head could be expected
from the state at best. While the figures may vary, Florida was
keeping a considerable number of Confederate soldiers fed, albeit poorly, and therefore in the ranks.25
The continuing supply of Florida beef was just one of the
problems that faced the embattled Confederacy in early 1864.
Lee’s army was suffering from its most acute food shortage of
the war. Alabama reported that all its surplus would be needed
by troops in that state and no more could be exported. Officials
estimated that within three weeks time, the state of Georgia
would be completely stripped of foodstuffs. However, Sherman
23. Johnston, Narrative of Military Operations, 263, 266.
24. White to Stubbs, December 30, 1863, White Papers, Box 2, Letterbook 1.
25. “Report of Beef Cattle,” Fourth District, December, 1863, White to Northrop, February 4, 1864, ibid., Box 1.
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would still be able to find rations for his army later during his
march through this same area. The shortage was debated
heatedly in the Confederate Congress. On January 6, 1864, a
Mississippi representative called for the speedy replacement of
the commissary-general; if this incompetent remained in office
after he had forfeited the confidence of Congress and the nation, he charged, the blame must be laid on President Davis
himself. Davis, unconcerned, defended his old friend, General
Northrop, calling him “one of the greatest geniuses in the
South.” If Northrop had the physical capacity, Davis declared,
he would put him at the head of an army.26
The supply of Florida beef was also coming to a halt as the
last few cows arrived at the front. Those beeves that did make
it were so lean that they provided very little meat. White put
some of his idle drovers to work slaughtering and salting some
of these cattle in Jackson County. The lack of barrels and boxes
and the materials to manufacture them hampered the packing
operation. White ordered it continued, however, in the hope
that at least a few barrels of salted beef might be shipped northward. It was difficult to obtain even a few extra pounds with the
swarms of agents from other organizations that were operating
in the region. Agents of Georgia’s Governor Brown, agents from
the city of Savannah, commissary men from other states, and a
legion from the Mining and Nitre Department and the railroad
companies were buying all the beef and other products that
they could get their hands on. None stopped to ask about the
legality of this under a Florida law that forbade this type of
activity. Florida commissary officers, however, had to compete
with them and found it exceedingly difficult to purchase anything at all. Higher prices added to an already soaring inflation
rate.27
Florida’s problems seemed inconsequential in comparison to
those of South Carolina. General Beauregard took it upon himself to discharge the state commissary agent, Major Guerin.
26. “Proceedings of the First Confederate Congress: Fourth Session, 7 December 1863-18 February 1864,” Southern Historical Society Papers, 52 vols.
(Richmond, 1876-1959), L, 196-97; Jones, A Rebel War Clerk, 326; Douglas
S. Freeman, Lee’s Lieutenants: A Study in Command, 3 vols. (New York, 1946),
III, 316.
27. O.R., Series 1, vol. 35, part 1, 522; White to Cummings, January 6, 1864;
White to Wilkinson Call, undated, White Papers, Box 2, Letterbook 1;
Proctor, ed., Florida A Hundred Years Ago, January, 1964, 1.
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Beauregard felt that Guerin lacked administrative ability, but
what he really lacked was Beauregard’s confidence. Northrop
defended his subordinate with the charge that the general did
not understand that Georgia and Florida had been called upon
to send large quantities of beef to the Army of Tennessee that
would have normally gone to Charleston. Had Beauregard’s orders in regard to the management of supplies been followed, “it
would have been impossible to keep up the supply of beeves
from Florida as long as has been done.” Guerin was reinstated
by presidential order, but the commissary department in South
Carolina remained under a cloud as long as General Beauregard
commanded in the state. Florida was fortunate not to have such
ego clashes in its supply system.28
Richmond did not let up, however, on its demands for
Florida beef during this time. Northrop decided that his plans
could succeed only if the flow of beef continued non-stop.
Surely, mused the commissary-general, a state so rich in cattle
could spare another thousand or so until summer returned.
Major White must have wearied of explaining to his superiors
how all the cattle that could be safely moved had already been
transferred. South Florida could possibly supply more, but the
long trip from the range to the nearest railroad line would be
far too much for the emaciated cattle. There were definite limits
to Florida’s potential as a cattle supplier, and for this season the
limit had been reached. Even Governor Milton admitted that
the supply was not as abundant in his state as he had supposed.29
In the meantime, White sought the sort of military protection that the Confederacy’s beef larder so clearly deserved. He
sent several letters to General Beauregard, detailing the situation and the potential danger from Union forces. Beauregard
sympathized, but was unable to send any troops. Those available
units in north Florida ultimately confronted the Union forces
in the Battle of Olustee on February 20, 1864. While it was not
the only reason for the Olustee campaign, the desire to interdict
the flow of cattle into Georgia was an important factor in General Truman A. Seymour’s ill-fated march toward Lake City.
28.
29.
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The disruption of supply lines caused by the fighting could be
seen in the privation of soldiers under seige in Charleston. The
troops had been getting a little beef four days out of every ten,
but in February no meat had been issued for several days. Major
Guerin was not sure when the next beef rations could be issued.
Commanders complained that front-line troops needed protein
in the form of beef to be able to function under fire.30
Guerin could only answer with the hope that they would be
well fed on Florida beef as soon as possible. The summer’s meat
ration would have to come from Florida sources. “If that should
fail,” he wrote, “the privation, I fear will be greater.” Major
White was well aware that the army around Charleston often
went without fresh meat. A similar fate awaited General
Johnston’s command. White desperately tried to head off the
coming crisis by sending all the bacon and pork in the state to
the front. The 2,500 Confederate troops in Florida could get
along on short rations of stringy native beef for a while. “Let us
send,” White said, “to those who deserve it our best meat.” His
Commissary Bureau men would accept this added burden,
White believed, because they were in the service from a sense
of duty and not for mundane reasons.31
The Olustee campaign into the interior had a stinging effect
on Floridians in and out of uniform; they now seemed more
willing to come forward and help supply government forces.
But there was one group of government charges that found
little comfort or benefit in this renewed spirit. Union prisoners
of war were on the bottom of a long list of people depending
on the Confederate military for their food. On March 15, 1864,
Captain H. M. Allen tried to secure 2,500 head of cattle to feed
the 6,000 prisoners in his district which included Columbus,
Georgia, and the new camp that came to be known as Andersonville. Allen could find no beef in his state, so he contacted White
for help. The major had no ready beef to send, giving the poor
quality of the cattle and the cold and continuous rains during
the winter as reasons. None could be available before the end
of April.32
30.
31.
32.
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As the time drew near for the 1864 cattle season to begin,
doubts existed about Florida’s ability to supply cattle on the same
scale as it had the previous year. White himself thought that the
number, while large, would not come close to the 1863 levels.
The threats posed by the Union army and navy, pro-Unionists,
deserters and draft evaders, and perhaps even the Seminoles,
grew daily. The isolated and unprotected herds made easy and
tempting targets. The Confederates could spare no regular
troops for the vital ranges of south Florida, and soldiers detailed
for droving duty had proved unpredictable. If the situation in
the South was not stablized, no cattle could be brought out.
Supply officers knew the consequences of that for the armies,
and in the end for the Confederacy itself.
Such conditions could not be allowed to continue if the needs
of the Confederate army were to be met through another lean
winter. White answered a query as to the number of cattle
Florida could deliver in late October 1864; 300 to 500 per week
were the best that could be expected. With luck the figure
might be boosted to 1,000, but this would become difficult as
winter grew near. Major Guerin complained that troops in
South Carolina already faced shortages and could be supplied
with any sort of meat only occasionally. Unrest gripped the city
of Charleston as citizens of the lower classes grumbled about
going without meat while the more elite groups had at least an
occasional meal that included beef or a little pork. To stave off
disaster, Guerin placed minimum requirements at 3,000 head
per month and asked that the cattle be moved to Savannah as
soon as possible.33
White interpreted Guerin’s request as an attempt to give
him a direct order. He angrily replied that he was under the
authority of the commissary-general, and that “no general can
command me and I will obey no orders except from those to
whom I report.“34 Three thousand head per month was not
even remotely possible; all that could be spared would be sent
into Georgia where Guerin could order his own drovers to collect them. Guerin, realizing that White’s good will was essential
to future shipments of Florida beef, quickly sent an apologetic
note clarifying his statements. He had not intended to relay a
33.
34.

M. B. Millen to White, October 31, 1864; Guerin to White, October 31,
1864, ibid.
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command but to convey a request; it was vital to have some idea
of how much cattle Charleston could expect from Florida. White
estimated 300 to 500 head a week if there was an uninterupted
flow from south Florida.35
Cattle operations once again were forced to continue late
into the fall of 1864, and about 500 head per week were crossing
the Florida-Georgia border. One officer thought that the
number would not vary unless “some raid of the enemy, or
interference of our Commissary-General, or some unanticipated
course breaks into our operations.“36 Drovers from Georgia received permission to cross into west Florida to gather such cattle
as they could find. The Georgians, however, complained that
the area assigned to them was inside Union lines. These men
found few cows in the area, since the bulk of them had been
removed or hidden by their owners. The 150 head they had
collected did not satisfy them, and their commander, Colonel D.
F. Cocke, was not a friend of White’s due to an earlier incident.
White had learned that Cocke had made personal investments
in large numbers of south Florida cattle with the hope of gaining
great profits. Major White warned Cocke that such purchases
were unwarranted and might be illegal. The beef in question
must be turned over to Confederate authorities, or Cocke would
face the consequences.37
As usual, much was expected from Florida during the winter
months of 1864. One Confederate official believed that as many
as 25,000 head could still be obtained there, which would yield
10,000,000 pounds of beef. To counter such optimistic pronouncements and to fend off congressional attacks, Northrop
issued a report on the availability of the Confederacy’s beef supply. Florida, he noted, had supplied large quantities of meat
and planned to continue the flow of beef. Twenty thousand
head might be possible, but claims that Florida could supply
hundreds of thousands of cattle were not valid. “These marvellous accounts,” wrote Northrop, “are believed to be idle, as this
bureau has received accurate information of the number.“38
35. Ibid.
36. I. C. Clancy to Guerin, November 23, 1864, ibid.
37. White to D. F. Cocke, November 2, 1863, ibid; Cocke to White, November
29, 1864, ibid, Box 1.
38. Charles H. Wesley, The Collapse of the Confederacy (Washington, DC, 1937),
7; Southern Historical Society Papers, II, 99.
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While Florida could still supply beef for the Confederacy in
the future, the cattle season for 1864 came to a close in January
1865. The collection of cattle in south Florida ceased as of January 9. Two factors influenced the decision to call a halt to the
trade: the position of Sherman’s army had disrupted communications and made it unsafe to move any more beef northward
into Georgia, and there was the continuing problem of forage
shortages in the winter months.39 Cattle moved again in the
spring and continued until the end of the war. By war’s end at
least 75,000 head had been delivered to the government, while
untold numbers had been traded covertly.40 Despite the amount
of beef exported from Florida for the use of the Confederate
army between 1862 and 1864, the expectations placed on the
state by those in charge of logistical planning were never met.
The many senior Confederate officers who had served in
Florida during the antebellum years, Commissary-General
Northrop and Robert E. Lee included, should have been able
to provide better information on conditions in the region. Supply officers there were forced to try to meet unrealistic requests
for more and more cattle.
Need for Florida beef had greatly increased after the fall of
Vicksburg and the re-organization of the Confederate supply
system in 1863. Florida cattle were vitally important for the
feeding of Confederate soldiers from Chattanooga to Charleston and giving them the nourishment to continue the struggle
in the face of increasingly overwhelming odds. In the end, cattle
from Florida could not keep Confederate troops free from the
pangs of hunger. Florida beef managed only to prolong the
contest, but not to alter its outcome.
39.
40.
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